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congested with actions, whether meritorious or not, that have no
real nexus to New York.2 3 The result achieved by applying the balancing test, therefore, more effectively advanced the legislative
objectives of the amended Rule 327 than does the amendment
itself.24
The doctrine of forum non conveniens provides the courts
with an effective tool for dismissing actions that are unduly burdensome and for which a more appropriate forum exists. In light of
the significant restriction placed on the courts' discretion by the
amendment to Rule 327, which appears superfluous in light of the
traditional balancing approach, it is urged that the legislature
reevaluate this legislation. Otherwise, the courts of this state will
be compelled to entertain actions that may contravene the very
purpose that the amendment sought to achieve.
Michael J. Virgadamo

GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW

GOL § 15-108: Judgment against defendant is reduced by the equitable share of the damages attributable to the defendant who
settled when that settling defendant is a vicariously liable employer
Section 15-108 of the General Obligations Law provides that a
release given to one or more persons liable in tort for the same
& Rubber Co., 13 App. Div. 2d 470, 470, 212 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (1st Dep't 1961); Regal
Knitwear Co. v. M. Hoffman & Co., 96 Misc. 2d 605, 613, 409 N.Y.S.2d 483, 488 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1978). Recognition of a "public duty" to protect the court system from unrelated actions has led the courts to make the motion sua sponte. See, e.g., Regal Knitwear,
96 Misc. 2d at 614, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 488; Wachsman v. Craftool Co., 77 Misc. 2d 360, 362,
353 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1973).
13 See supra notes 10 & 23 and accompanying text.
24 Compare supra note 8 and accompanying text (economic benefits offered by the
amendment) with supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text (possibility of detrimental economic effect). While those parties with beneficial contacts to the forum should be confident
that their actions will be entertained upon invoking a forum-selection clause, it is submitted
that those attempting to use the judicial resources of New York without offering any benefit
to the state should not be permitted to burden the courts.
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injury does not discharge any non-settling tortfeasors from liability.1 Rather, it reduces the plaintiff's potential recovery from the
non-settling tortfeasors, 2 and prevents them from seeking contribution from the released tortfeasor. 3 Moreover, New York courts
Section 15-108 of the GOL provides:
(a) Effect of release of or covenant not to sue tortfeasors. When a release or a
covenant not to sue or not to enforce a judgment is given to one of two or more
persons liable or claimed to be liable in tort for the same injury, or the same
wrongful death, it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for
the injury of wrongful death unless its terms expressly so provide; but it reduces
the claim of the releasor against the other tortfeasors to the extent of any amount
stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration
paid for it, or in the amount of the released tortfeasor's equitable share of the
damages under article fourteen of the civil practice law and rules, whichever is the
greatest.
(b) Release of tortfeasor. A release given in good faith by the injured person
to one tortfeasor as provided in subdivision (a) relieves him from liability to any
other person for contribution as provided in article fourteen of the civil practice
law and rules.
(c) Waiver of contribution. A tortfeasor who has obtained his own release
from liability shall not be entitled to contribution from any other person.
GOL § 15-108 (McKinney 1978).
' Id. Prior to its amendment in 1974, § 15-108 provided that a release reduced the
releasor's recovery against remaining tortfeasors by the amount in the release, or the consideration paid for it, whichever amount was greater. See GOL § 15-108 (McKinney 1970).
Courts interpreting the 1972 version of § 15-108, see GOL, ch. 830, § 15-108, [1972] N.Y.
Laws 3216, 3217 (amended, GOL, ch. 742, § 15-108, [1974] N.Y. Laws 1915, 1916), held that
a released tortfeasor was not discharged from contributionliability to the remaining defendants. See, e.g., Blass v. Hennessey, 44 App. Div. 2d 405, 406-07, 355 N.Y.S.2d 506, 507-08
(4th Dep't 1974) (non-settling tortfeasor has right of apportionment against settling
tortfeasor); Williams v. Town of Niskayuna, 72 Misc. 2d 441, 442, 339 N.Y.S.2d 888, 889
(Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1972) (release does not conclusively establish amount joint
tortfeasor required to pay); Michelucci v. Bennett, 71 Misc. 2d 347, 348-49, 335 N.Y.S.2d
967, 969-70 (Sup. Ct. Washington County 1972) (settlement does not preclude action by
non-settling defendant against settling defendants). This interpretation served as a disincentive to settle. See GOL § 15-108, commentary at 717-18 (McKinney 1978).
To encourage settlements and assure that no non-settling tortfeasor would be responsible for more than an equitable share of the damages, the 1972 version of GOL § 15-108 was
amended. See TWENTIETH ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. CONFERENCE 224-25 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as TWENTIETH REP.].

GOL § 15-108(a) allows injured parties to settle their claims against one tortfeasor without forfeiting their rights against other wrongdoers. TWENTIETH REP., supra, at 225; see
Franzek v. Calspan Corp., 78 App. Div. 2d 134, 138, 434 N.Y.S.2d 288, 290 (4th Dep't 1980);
see also Rock v. Reed-Prentice Div., Package Mach. Co., 39 N.Y.2d 34, 41, 346 N.E.2d 520,
523-24, 382 N.Y.S.2d 720, 723 (1976) (statute allows plaintiff to settle with one defendant
without discharging other tortfeasors); Plath v. Justus, 28 N.Y.2d 16, 22-23, 268 N.E.2d 117,
120, 319 N.Y.S.2d 433, 439 (1971) (injured party may settle with one tortfeasor while reserving rights against other tortfeasor).
3 GOL § 15-108(b) (McKinney 1978); see Torres v. State, 67 App. Div. 2d 814, 814, 413
N.Y.S.2d 262, 263 (4th Dep't 1979) (mem.) (settling tortfeasor entitled to summary judgment dismissing counterclaim for contribution from other tortfeasor).
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have consistently read GOL section 15-108 in conjunction with the
contribution rights set forth in Article 14 of the CPLR,4 and thereEarly New York cases followed the contribution principles set forth in the English case
of Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). See Note, The New Right of
Relative Contribution:Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 37 ALB. L. REv. 154, 154 (1972). In Merryweather, the court proscribed a right of contribution between jointly and severally liable
tortfeasors who committed intentional torts. 101 Eng. Rep. at 1341. While New York courts
acknowledged the idea of dividing a burden equally among tortfeasors, they did not recognize the right of tortfeasors to seek recovery among themselves. Note, supra, at 154-55.
In 1928, the legislature modified the common-law rule by passing § 211-a of the Civil
Practice Act. See CPA § 211-a (McKinney 1928); Farrel & Wilner, Dole v. Dow Chemical
Co.: A Leading Decision-But Where?, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 330, 330 (1972). Section 211-a
created a right to contribution among tortfeasors who had been joined in an action by the
plaintiff only if one of several joint tortfeasors paid more than a pro rata share of a joint
judgment. Farrell & Wilner, supra, at 330; see also SIEGEL § 174. Case law further defined
contribution rights among tortfeasors by creating an "active-passive" qualification; if one
tortfeasor could demonstrate that his conduct was "passive" in creating the injury while
another tortfeasor's actions were "active," the "passive" wrongdoer was entitled to implead
and seek full indemnification from the "active" tortfeasors. SIEGEL § 170. However, the "active-passive" dichotomy proved to be ambiguous and a hindrance in evaluating a
tortfeasor's rights and obligations. See id.
Contribution rights were redefined in Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282
N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), in which the Court of Appeals rejected the activepassive standard and allowed a joint tortfeasor the right to seek contribution, id. at 148-49,
282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387. The Court held that fault is to be apportioned by a
jury according to each tortfeasor's degree of culpability. Id. at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331
N.Y.S.2d at 391-92. For an extensive discussion of the ramifications of the Dole decision on
multi-party liability, see SIEGEL § 171; Farrell & Wilmer, supra, at 333-49; Schwab, Dole v.
Dow Chemical Co.: A Preliminary Analysis, 45 N.Y. ST. B.J. 144, 146-64 (1973); Wilner,
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: The Kaleidescopic Impact of a Leading Case, 42 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 457 (1976); 44 ALB. L. REv. 718, 721-24 (1980).
Article 14 of the CPLR codified the Dole decision and created a right of contribution
for a tortfeasor whether or not the plaintiff has sued the other tortfeasors. See SIEGEL § 172,
at 212; 44 ALB. L. REV. 719, 722 (1972).
' See Riviello v. Waldron, 47 N.Y.2d 297, 306, 391 N.E.2d 1278, 1283, 418 N.Y.S.2d 300,
305 (1979); Rock v. Reed-Prentice Div., Package Mach. Co., 39 N.Y.2d 34, 39-40, 346 N.E.2d
520, 523, 382 N.Y.S.2d 720, 722-23 (1976). CPLR Article 14 provides:
Section 1401. Claim for contribution
Except as provided in section 15-108 of the general obligations law, two or
more persons who are subject to liability for damages for the same personal injury,
injury to property or wrongful death, may claim contribution among them
whether or not an action has been brought or a judgment has been rendered
against the person from whom contribution is sought.
Section 1402. Amount of contribution
The amount of contribution to which a person is entitled shall be the excess
paid by him over and above his equitable share of the judgment recovered by the
injured party; but no person shall be required to contribute an amount greater
than his equitable share. The equitable shares shall be determined in accordance
with the relative culpability of each person liable for contribution.
Section 1404. Rights of persons entitled to damages not affected; rights of indem-
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fore have determined that it does not apply to indemnification
claims. 5 Recently, in Mead v. Bloom, 6 the Court of Appeals affirmed an Appellate Division decision that clarified the relationnity or subrogation preserved
(a) Nothing contained in this article shall impair the rights of any person
entitled to damages under existing law.
(b) Nothing contained in this article shall impair the right of indemnity or
subrogation under existing law.
CPLR 1401-1404 (McKinney 1978).
The current Article 14, entitled "Contribution," was enacted in 1974, see CPLR Art. 14,
ch. 742, § 1, [1974] N.Y. Laws 1915, and repealed the former Article 14, "Actions Between
Joint Tort-Feasors," see 2A WK&M § 1401.01, at 14-3 (1984). Incorporating the rule enunciated in Dole, CPLR 1402 allows a tortfeasor to recover in contribution the sum paid by
him in excess of his apportioned share of damages. See CPLR 1402; Survey, 49 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 184, 185 (1974); TwENTIETH REP., supra note 2, at 220. Moreover, § 1401, following
Dole, allows a tortfeasor to seek contribution from another wrongdoer regardless of whether
a joint judgment was entered against the wrongdoers. See CPLR 1401 (McKinney 1976);
TWENTIETH REP., supra note 2, at 217. Previously, a joint judgment had to be entered
against the tortfeasors as a condition to a contribution right. See Dole, 30 N.Y.2d at 153,
282 N.E.2d at 294-95, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92; TWENTIETH REP., supra note 2, at 217.
5 See, e.g., Graphic Arts Mut.. Ins. Co. v. Bakers Mut. Ins. Co., 45 N.Y.2d 551, 558-59,
382 N.E.2d 1347, 1350, 410 N.Y.S.2d 571, 575 (1978) (Dole does not authorize apportionment of liability among primarily and vicariously liable tortfeasors); Kelly v. Diesel Constr.
Div., 35 N.Y.2d 1, 6-7, 315 N.E.2d 751, 753-54, 358 N.Y.S.2d 685, 689 (1974) (contribution
allowed against tortfeasors that are actually at fault, as distinguished from those that are
vicariously liable); Rogers v. Dorchester Assocs., 32 N.Y.2d 553, 566, 300 N.E.2d 403, 410,
347 N.Y.S.2d 22, 32-33 (1973) (no contribution claims exist in case involving indemnification
claim). The Court in Dorchester read Dole as leaving the principles of common-law indemnification intact. See Dorchester, 32 N.Y.2d at 565-66, 300 N.E.2d at 410, 347 N.Y.S.2d at
32. For a general discussion of common-law indemnification principles before the expansion
of the "active-passive' rule, see Meriam & Thorton, Indemnity between Tort-Feasors;An
Evolving Doctrine in the New York Court of Appeals, 25 N.Y.U. L. REV. 845 (1950).
Indemnification is created by express or implied contract and usually involves a shifting of
the entire loss from one tortfeasor to another. See McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge,
304 N.Y. 314, 328, 107 N.E. 463, 471 (1952); Greenstone, Spreading the Loss - Indemnity,
Contribution, Comparative Negligence and Subrogation, 13 FORUM 266, 268 (1977); The
Survey, 47 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 185, 194 (1972). In some cases, the law imposes liability on a
party who has committed no actual wrong, but who is held liable for an injury as a matter of
social policy because he can spread the risk of the loss to society as a whole. See Mauro v.
McCrindle, 70 App. Div. 2d 77, 82, 419 N.Y.S.2d 710, 713-14 (2d Dep't), a/'d, 52 N.Y.2d
719, 417 N.E.2d 567, 436 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1980); see also Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity
Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130, 146-50 (1932).
Conversely, contribution, which is "the right of a wrongdoer, who has paid the injured
person's damages, to make other wrongdoers contribute to what has been paid," SIEGEL §
169, arises when the liability "is shared among wrongdoers who are in pari delicto," GOL §
15-108, commentary at 719 (McKinney 1978). Although New York courts have retained the
distinction between contribution and indemnification claims, one commentator has suggested that GOL § 15-108 could logically be applied to both concepts. See 44 ALB. L.J. 719,
728 (1980).
' 94 App. Div. 2d 423, 464 N.Y.S.2d 904 (4th Dep't 1983), aff'd, 62 N.Y.2d 788, 465
N.E.2d 1262, 477 N.Y.S.2d 326 (1984) (mem.).
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ship between these statutes by holding that when a plaintiff releases an employer who is vicariously liable for the negligence of its
employee, the non-settling tortfeasor is entitled to have the judgment reduced by the employer's "equitable share of the damages"
pursuant to GOL section 15-108."
In Mead, the plaintiff's automobile was struck by an automobile driven by Karen Bloom and owned by her father Maurice. s
James Mead brought a personal injury action against the Blooms;
Karen's employer, MCA Distribution Corp.; the manufacturer of
the Blooms' automobile, General Motors; and the distributor that
had repaired the brakes on the Blooms' car, Hallman-Adkins
Chevrolet, Inc." The claim asserted against General Motors was
settled before trial.10 Because Maurice Bloom and MCA were vicariously liable for Karen Bloom's negligence, the trial court instructed the jury to consider those three defendants as one unit
when apportioning liability.11 The court further instructed the jury
that Hallman-Adkins was to be considered a separate unit for liability purposes."'
Before the jury rendered its verdict, MCA settled with the
plaintiff for $40,000.13 The jury then returned a verdict against all
the defendants for $500,000 and found the comparative negligence
of the Blooms and MCA, as one unit, to be 75%, and that of Hallman-Adkins to be 25%.' 4
In accordance with GOL section 15-108, Hallman-Adkins
sought to reduce the amount of damages apportioned against it by
7 62 N.Y.2d at 790, 465 N.E.2d at 1262, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 326-27, aff'g 94 App. Div. 2d
423, 464 N.Y.S.2d 904 (4th Dep't 1983).
8 94 App. Div. 2d at 424, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 905.

9 Id. The plaintiff alleged that the accident occurred while Karen Bloom was working
for MCA. Id. GM was brought into the suit under the theory that it manufactured and
distributed the car with defective brakes. Id. The plaintiff alleged that Hallman-Adkins had
negligently repaired the brakes on the Bloom's car. Id. Hallman-Adkins cross-claimed
against the Blooms and MCA for contribution. Id.
1o Id. GM settled with the plaintiff before trial for $12,500. Id.
11 Id. at 425, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 906. Of the defendants that went to trial, theories of
fault were pleaded only against Karen Bloom, for negligent operation of the car, and Hallman-Adkins, for negligent repair of the car. See id. at 424-25, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 905-06. Liability was sought to be imposed upon Maurice Bloom as owner of the car, and upon MCA as
Karen's employer. See id.; see also infra note 31 & accompanying text.
12 94 App. Div. 2d at 424, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
23 Id.
14 Id. The parties agreed to reduce the $500,000 jury verdict by the amount of the GM
settlement. Id.
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75%, MCA's "equitable share" of the damages. 15 The trial court
denied Hallman-Adkins' motion and reduced the verdict by only
the amount of MCA's settlement. 6 The Appellate Division, Fourth
Department, reversed."i
Justice Boomer, writing for a unanimous panel, 8 noted that
GOL section 15-108 was to be read in conjunction with CPLR Article 14,19 and construed the Mead case to involve contribution
rights between tortfeasors MCA and Hallman-Adkins, and not an
indemnification claim between MCA and Karen Bloom, which
would have rendered GOL section 15-108 inapplicable.2 0 Furthermore, the court held that Hallman-Adkins was entitled to contribution rights against MCA even though MCA was only vicariously
liable for the tort of its employee, 2 ' noting that GOL section 15108(a) affords relief to a party who has lost his contribution rights
against a released tortfeasor.2 2 Therefore, the court reasoned, since
Mead released MCA from liability, and consequently deprived
Hallman-Adkins of a right to contribution from MCA,2" Mead's
claim against Hallman-Adkins must be reduced by MCA's "equita24
ble share of the damages.'
The Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of Justice
Boomer's opinion.25 Judge Wachtler, however, in a forceful dissent,.
15 Id.

!d.
I6
18

Id. at 424-25, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
Id. at 426, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 906. Presiding Justice Dillon, and Justices Hancock,

Doerr, and Moule joined in the opinion. Id.
'9Id. at 425, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 905 (quoting Riviello v. Waldron, 47 N.Y.2d 297, 307, 391
N.E.2d 1278, 1284, 418 N.Y.S.2d 300, 305 (1975)).
20 See 94 App. Div. 2d at 426, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 905. The Mead court noted that the
indemnification claims are not applicable to GOL § 15-108. Id. at 425, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
21 Id. The court noted that GOL § 15-108(a) provides relief to a person who has lost his
contribution rights against a released tortfeasor by reducing the injured party's judgment
against the non-released tortfeasor by the releasee's equitable share of the damage, when
that share is greater than the amount contained in the release or the amount paid for it. Id.;
see GOL § 15-108(a).
22 94 App. Div. 2d at 425, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
23 Id.; see GOL § 15-108(b).
24 94 App. Div. 2d at 425, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 905. Because the court determined that the
Blooms and MCA were one unit for contribution purposes, id., 464 N.Y.S.2d at 906, and
because the court concluded that MCA and the Blooms were jointly and severally liable for
their percentage of the judgment, id., Justice Boomer reasoned that Hallman-Adkins would
have been entitled to seek 75% of the judgment in contribution from MCA, id. at 425-26,
464 N.Y.S.2d at 906. Therefore, using the jury determination of apportionment of fault,
MCA's "equitable share" of the damages was 75%. Id. at 426, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 906.
25 62 N.Y.2d 788, 790, 465 N.E.2d 1262, 1262, 477 N.Y.S.2d 326, 326-27 (1984).
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contended that GOL section 15-108 applies only to settlement by
joint tortfeasors and not to claims asserted against parties who
were merely vicariously liable.26 Since MCA was not a joint
tortfeasor and was merely vicariously liable, Judge Wachtler asserted that the equitable-share reduction was inapplicable, and
that the verdict should have been reduced solely by MCA's settle27
ment amount.
The recognition that section 15-108 applies only to
"tortfeasors" ' 8 and not to indemnification claims was critical to the
Appellate Division's reasoning in Mead. 9 In determining whether
section 15-108 may be invoked, courts traditionally have examined
the relationship of the party claiming contribution to the settling
tortfeasor against whom the claim is made. 0 If the relationship is
based on vicarious liability or indemnity, the provisions of section
21
27

Id. at 790, 465 N.E.2d at 1262, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 327 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
Id. at 790, 465 N.E.2d at 1263, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 327 (Wachtler, J. dissenting). The

dissent, relying on Riviello, stressed that GOL § 15-108 should be read in conjunction with
the contribution rights set forth in Article 14, which do not apply to indemnification claims.
Id. at 792, 465 N.E.2d at 1263-64, 477 N.Y.S. 2d at 327-28. Judge Wachtler asserted that the
purpose of § 15-108 was to clarify the principles of settlement and contribution rights enunciated in Dole only among joint tortfeasors. Id. at 793, 465 N.E.2d at 1264, 477 N.Y.S.2d at
328 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
28 Id. at 792, 465 N.E.2d at 1264, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 328 (Wachtler, J., dissenting). Judge
Wachtler rejected the majority's claim that Hallman-Adkins would lose its contribution
rights if § 15-108 were deemed to be inapplicable. Id. at 795-96, 465 N.E.2d at 1266, 477
N.Y.S.2d at 330 (Wachtler, J., dissenting). Rather, the dissenting judge argued that the law
prior to enactment of GOL § 15-108, which allowed non-settling tortfeasors to seek contribution against tortfeasors who had settled with the injured party before trial, would be appropriate in the Mead case. Id. (Wachtler, J., dissenting). Judge Wachtler wrote that
"[a]bsent a statutory directive to the contrary, there can be no question that a plaintiff's
release of one defendant cannot operate to defeat the rights of others who are not parties to
the release agreement." Id. at 796, 465 N.E.2d at 1266, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 330 (Wachtler, J.,
dissenting).
29 See, e.g., Franzek v. Calspan Corp., 78 App. Div. 2d 134, 141-42, 434 N.Y.S.2d 288,

292 (4th Dep't 1980) (§ 15-108 bars contribution claims against tortfeasors who have obtained post-accident releases); Heinsohn v. Putnam Community Hosp., 65 App. Div. 2d 767,
767, 409 N.Y.S.2d 785, 786 (2d Dep't 1978)

(§

15-108 inapplicable if party only liable deriva-

tively). In enacting § 15-108, the legislature intended the term "tortfeasor" to encompass all
those who were entitled to contribution rights under CPLR Article 14 - joint tortfeasors,
concurrent tortfeasors, successive and independent tortfeasors, alternative tortfeasors, and
even intentional tortfeasors. See TWENTETH REPORT., supra note 2, at 214, 227.
21 See 94 App. Div. 2d at 424-26, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 905-06; see also McDermott v. New
York, 50 N.Y.2d 211, 220, 406 N.E.2d 460, 464, 428 N.Y.S.2d 643, 648 (1980) (Q 15-108
inapplicable to indemnity claims); Riviello v. Waldron, 47 N.Y.2d 297, 306, 391 N.E.2d 1278,
1283, 418 N.Y.S.2d 300, 305 (1979) (Q 15-108 must be read in conjunction with contribution
rights as defined in CPLR 1401-1403); Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co. v. Gleason Works, 78
App. Div. 2d 966, 966-67, 433 N.Y.S.2d 899, 900 (4th Dep't 1980) (mem.) (Q 15-108 does not
bar plaintiff's action based solely on indemnification claim).
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15-108 are not applicable. 31 However, if the tortfeasors each owe a
duty to the wronged party, even a duty arising under different theories of liability,3 2 a contribution relationship exists, and, it is sug33
gested, section 15-108 should apply.
New York courts have recognized that contribution may lie
against a vicariously liable party when the claim is brought by a
wrongdoer other than the tortfeasor whose conduct rendered the
party vicariously liable. 4 In reaching this conclusion, the courts
have reasoned that a person directly responsible for a wrong, and a
party vicariously liable for the fault, are together considered to
have committed a single wrong.3 5 Therefore, the "active" tortfeasor
and the vicariously liable party are deemed one "unit" for contribution purposes, and, consequently, both parties are together considred to be "tortfeasors" in relation to other wrongdoers,3 6 rendering the provisions of section 15-108 applicable.3
Since the active tortfeasor and the vicariously liable party are
responsible for a single wrong, it has been held that there can be
31 See, e.g., Heinsohn v. Putnam Community Hosp., 65 App. Div. 2d 767, 768, 409
N.Y.S.2d 785, 786-87 (2d Dep't 1978) (mem.) (court examined relationship between parties);
Felice v. St. Agnes Hosp., 65 App. Div. 2d 388, 389, 411 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 (2d Dep't 1978)
(court must determine relationship between parties). In Felice, the plaintiffs brought a malpractice action against three doctors and the hospital in which the plaintiff's decedent received treatment. 65 App. Div. 2d at 389, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 903. The physicians settled with
the plaintiff prior to judgment and sought to be released from further liability in the plaintiff's action against the hospital. Id. at 389, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 903. The court refused to grant
the physicians' request for release from the suit under GOL § 15-108 until it could be determined whether the parties' relationship was based on vicarious liability or whether they
were joint tortfeasors. Id. at 390-91, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 903-04.
" See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
" See Crow-Crimmins-Wolff & Munier v. Westchester, 90 App. Div. 2d 785, 786, 455
N.Y.S.2d 390, 391 (2d Dep't 1982); North Colonie Cent. School Dist. v. MacFarland Constr.
Co., 60 App. Div. 2d 685, 686, 399 N.Y.S.2d 933, 934 (3d Dep't 1977); Taft v. Shafer Trucking, 52 App. Div. 2d 255, 259, 383 N.Y.S.2d 744, 747 (4th Dep't 1976), appeal dismissed, 42
N.Y.2d 974 (1977).
'" See supra note 4.
31 See Graphic Arts Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bakers Mut. Ins. Co., 58 App. Div. 2d 397, 401, 397
N.Y.S.2d 66, 70 (2d Dep't 1977), aff'd, 45 N.Y.2d 551, 382 N.E.2d 1347, 410 N.Y.S.2d 571
(1978); see also Rivera v. McCarthy, 54 App. Div. 2d 757, 758, 387 N.Y.S.2d 704, 705 (2d
Dep't 1976) (contribution exists from one vicariously liable when claim is asserted by other
than the active tortfeasor whose actions rendered alleged joint tortfeasor vicariously liable).
31 See Zeglen v. Minkiewica, 12 N.Y.2d 497, 499-500, 191 N.E.2d 450, 451, 240 N.Y.S.2d
965, 967 (1963); Canale v. Binghamton Amusement Co., 45 App. Div. 2d 424, 427, 357
N.Y.S.2d 931, 934 (3d Dep't 1974), afl'd, 37 N.Y.2d 875, 340 N.E.2d 729, 378 N.Y.S.2d 362
(1975); Martindale v. Griffin, 233 App. Div. 510, 513, 253 N.Y.S. 578, 581 (4th Dep't 1931),
aff'd, 259 N.Y. 530, 182 N.E. 167 (1932).
37 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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no apportionment of liability between these parties.3s which held
that apportionment rules apply only to those parties who share responsibility for causing an injury, and not to parties whose relationship is based on indemnity.40
Although the Mead Court dramatically reduced the size of the
plaintiff's recovery by reducing the verdict by MCA's equitable
share of the damages rather than by its settlement amount,4 1 such
a result is not of itself inconsistent with the policies behind Dole,
which seek to provide a rule of apportionment among tortfeasors
rather than to ensure that a plaintiff's recovery remains large.4 2
Furthermore, it is suggested that the Court's decision in Mead is
further supported by its consistency with the public policy of encouraging settlement in multi-party cases.4 s
Andrea M. DiGregorio
See Graphic Arts Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bakers Mut. Ins. Co., 45 N.Y.2d 551, 558-59, 382
N.E.2d 1347, 1350-51, 410 N.Y.S.2d 571, 575 (1978); Canale v. Binghamton Amusement Co.,
45 App. Div. 2d 424, 427, 357 N.Y.S.2d 931, 933-34 (3d Dep't 1974), af'd, 37 N.Y.2d 875,
340 N.E.2d 729, 378 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1975). In Canale, the plaintiff sued Binghamton Enterprise, Inc., Binghamton Amusement Co., and its employee James Curran for destruction of a
building. 45 App. Div. 2d at 426, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 933. The jury apportioned damages of
25% against Enterprise, 65% against Amusement, and 10% against Curran. Id. On appeal,
the Third Department determined that this apportionment of damages was error, stating
that "there can be no unequal apportionment of liability between corporation and employee
since there was but a single wrong." Id. at 427, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 934. Therefore, the court
consolidated the apportioned damages of Amusement and its employee Curran, and entered
judgment apportioning damages of 25% against Enterprise and 75% against Amusement
and Curran. Id. at 428, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 934.
This theory is premised upon the logic of Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,"'
9 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
40 See id. at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92; see also Rogers v.
Dorchester Assocs., 32 N.Y.2d 553, 565-66, 300 N.E.2d 403, 410, 347 N.Y.S.2d 22, 32 (1973)
(apportionment applies to those who share responsibility in fact). The Dorchester Court
held that the rule of Dole was not intended to overturn the common-law principles of indemnification between vicariously liable tortfeasors and tortfeasors guilty of the acts which
caused the harm. 32 N.Y.2d at 565-66, 300 N.E.2d at 410, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 32.
41 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
42 See Graphics Arts Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bakers Mut. Ins. Co., 45 N.Y.2d 551, 557, 382
N.E.2d 1347, 1350, 410 N.Y.S.2d 571, 574 (1978); see also Sage v. Hale, 80 Misc. 2d 812, 814,
364 N.Y.S.2d 781, 784 (Sup. Ct. Saratoga County 1975) (purpose of Dole not to alter duties
between plaintiff and defendant).
43 See TWENTIETH REP., supra note 2, at 211. Prior to the amendment of § 15-108, there
was a disincentive for settlement because a settling tortfeasor would still be subject to contribution claims from other tortfeasors. See supra note 2. By amending § 15-108 to relieve a
settling tortfeasor from contribution claims from other parties, the legislature hoped to encourage pretrial settlements. See TWENTIETH REP., supra note 2, at 211.

